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1 Introduction 
A major ingredient of governmental responses to demographic changes eroding the financial 
basis of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems has been to favor household saving for 
retirement purposes. Currently, certified financial instruments for retirement saving are 
promoted by means of tax deductions and subsidies in several countries.
1 A crucial issue 
about such government-sponsored retirement plans is whether households finance their 
contributions with genuinely new saving – that would not have been done in the absence of 
those incentives – or with reductions in other assets, including increased borrowing. While 
new savings add to national wealth and raise future national income, a mere reallocation of 
financial assets has, if any, ambiguous effects on future national income. Hence, the 
evaluation of tax-favored retirement plans hinges upon their impact on households’ saving 
behavior. Since 2002 also the German government supports private retirement saving plans by 
means of a saving incentive program called the Riester scheme. Meanwhile, generous 
incentives and pessimistic expectations about future pension benefits from the PAYG system 
have led a substantial fraction of the German population in working age to participate in the 
Riester scheme. This paper presents estimates of the effect of the Riester scheme on the 
saving propensities of German households. 
The extent to which tax incentives and subsidies raise private saving is still an 
unresolved issue. For the eligible households, standard theory does not offer an unambiguous 
prediction because of countervailing income and substitution effects from a higher net return 
on saving. Further insights are offered by behavioral economics. Subsidized private pension 
schemes may increase households’ savings if those schemes include penalties from early 
withdrawals that act as a valuable self-control device for savers. However, behavioral 
approaches may also predict that subsidized schemes reduce private saving. To the extent that 
households follow the rule of saving enough to replace a fixed percentage of their income in 
retirement, a higher net return on saving reduces the amount of saving necessary for that 
replacement. Furthermore, the savings of households not eligible for the subsidy may be 
affected. If the subsidy is financed by increased taxes on non-eligible households or by 
reducing the transfers that they receive, the saving by non-eligible households is likely to 
diminish.    
Previous empirical research on the effectiveness of saving incentives has dealt 
overwhelmingly with the US experience (Antolín et al., 2004, Annex 2). In the United States, 
401(k) has become the main vehicle for retirement saving and much attention has been 

1 See Antolín et al. (2004) and Yoo and de Serres (2004) for overviews. 5 
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devoted to evaluate its effectiveness. Early influential papers by Engen et al. (1994) and 
Poterba  et al. (1995) presented results from median regressions and reached quite 
contradictory conclusions about the substitution between 401(k) assets and other type of 
savings. Recent papers, employing more sophisticated estimation techniques, have tended to 
find much heterogeneity in households’ responses to 401(k)s and substantial crowding-out 
effects in the case of high-income households (Benjamin, 2003; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 
2004).
2 For Germany, Corneo et al. (2009) have evaluated the Riester scheme as a natural 
experiment which affects the saving propensity of a treatment group relative to a control 
group. Their findings cast some doubts on the effectiveness of the Riester scheme in terms of 
mobilization of new savings.
3
The current paper substantially extends the work presented in Corneo et al. (2009) 
along four main dimensions. First, we consider a broader set of treatment and control groups. 
In particular, we compare changes in the saving propensities of households eligible for Riester 
subsidies with the changes in saving propensities of non-eligible households, changes in the 
savings of households who benefit from high subsidies relative to those who receive low 
subsidies, and changes in the savings of eligible households having a Riester contract and 
those who do not. Second, we exploit statistical matching and panel regression techniques to 
address important issues of self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity. Third, in addition to 
the German Socio-Economic Panel we use the SAVE dataset, which has been explicitly 
designed to investigate the saving behavior of private households in Germany. Fourth, we 
provide not only an evaluation in a pre- vs. post-reform perspective but also an assessment of 
the impact of the so-called Riester steps, namely the stepwise increase in subsidies and 
required saving amounts over time.  
In order to check the robustness of our empirical findings, we rely on three estimation 
methods. First, we use random-effects tobit panel models to regress saving rates before and 
after the reform on a dummy distinguishing treated and non-treated subjects after the reform, 
a post-reform dummy, and a set of socio-economic characteristics. Size and sign of the 
marginal effects of the treatment dummies serve as indicators of a stimulating effect of the 
Riester scheme in the various approaches. Second, we take first differences of the savings 
ratio and other explanatory variables and run OLS regressions in first differences. Thereby, 
treatments effects are identified by sign and size of the treatment coefficient. Third, we 

2 See also Duflo et al. (2007) who have evaluated the “saver’s credit”, a US federal program to encourage 
retirement savings, finding modest effects. 
3 Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) and Pfarr and Schneider (2009) have investigated the determinants of participation 
in the Riester scheme. The uptake of Riester contracts offers circumstantial evidence of displacement effects. 6 
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provide estimates for a subsample where treated and control subjects share the same socio-
economic and demographic characteristics. We identify such statistical twins using a 
matching algorithm recently proposed by Iacus et al. (2008). Their algorithm ensures that 
treated and control units are approximately balanced on the matching variables. With the 
matched observations at hand, it is then possible to infer the average treatment effect on the 
treated.  
Even though we apply a wide range of methods and specifications, we come to the 
unambiguous conclusion that in Germany household saving hardly responded to the 
introduction of that saving incentive program. Participation in the Riester scheme seems to 
largely substitute for other forms of saving. More specifically, we find insignificant treatment 
effects in all first-differences regressions and most random-effects specifications. These 
outcomes are reconfirmed by the matching results of all approaches and year combinations. 
That we find significantly positive mobilization effects on private savings in some random-
effects specifications can be attributed to self-selection and endogeneity bias. Moreover, our 
main implication is similar for evaluations of the reform itself (comparing savings before and 
after the introduction of the reform with SOEP data) and of the progression of the reform 
steps (comparing savings at different points in time during the reform with SAVE data).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
functioning of the Riester scheme. The econometric modeling is described in Section 3. Our 
databases, the German Socio Economic Panel and the SAVE Study, are presented in Section 
4.  In Section 5, we discuss our results and conclude in Section 6. 
2 The Riester scheme 
The Riester scheme started operating in 2002. Beneficiaries receive allowances (a basic 
allowance and child allowances), and can lower their income tax liability by means of 
deductions. A minimum saving effort is requested from the beneficiaries. More precisely, the 
allowance and the personal saving effort must add up to a specific amount, which is 
proportional to the individual’s income subject to social insurance contributions. The 
minimum saving amount is defined as a share of the income subject to social insurance 
contribution of the previous year, including the allowances. This share increased stepwise 
from one percent in the first year to four percent in 2008. These so-called Riester steps are 
displayed in Figure 1. Also the level of allowances and the maximal amount of tax deductions 7 

have been increased stepwise since the introduction of the Riester scheme.
4 If the Riester 
scheme stimulated private savings, its mobilization effect should be visible in a pre- and post-
reform comparison as well as along the Riester steps: the higher the required minimum 
savings amount and the subsidies granted, the higher the household savings.  
Figure 1 about here 
A large portion of the active population in Germany is eligible for Riester subsidies, estimates 
going up to 36 million people (Bräuninger, 2005). Basically, all compulsorily insured persons 
in the German public pension system are eligible for Riester contracts. In addition, public 
servants, trainees, individuals in the mandatory military or social service, and the recipients of 
some types of public transfers (e.g., unemployment benefits) may participate. Persons who are 
not statutorily insured in the mandatory public pension system are usually not eligible. Those 
persons include several groups of self-employees, marginal employees and students, social 
welfare recipients, and senior citizens receiving a pension.
5  
The impact of the Riester scheme on national (private plus public) saving also depends 
on its effect on the public debt. An exact calculation of the fiscal burden from the Riester 
scheme can only be performed with some delay because the deadline of application for a 
certain contribution year is two years later. Table 1 provides an overview of the current fiscal 
costs of the Riester scheme. The non-italic figures show the actual allowances and tax 
deductions. Assuming a constant relation between allowances and tax deductions as well as a 
proportional relation of Riester contracts on the one hand and both allowances
6 and tax 
deductions on the other hand, our extrapolation (italic figures) yields annual direct costs of 2.8 
billion euros for 2008, which is about 2.7 percent of public expenditure in that year (see 
Federal Statistical Office at http://www.destatis.de), and in the following years, depending on 
how the uptake of Riester contracts develops. In addition, indirect costs for certification, 
administration, etc. have to be accounted for. 
Table 1 about here 

4 Schulze and Jochem (2007) provide a detailed introduction to the German pension system and its recent 
reforms, including the Riester scheme. The political economy of the Riester reform has recently been analyzed 
by Kemmerling and Neugart (2009). 
5 Eligibility regulations are very detailed and include a broad range of exemptions. Furthermore, there have been 
some adjustments in the regulations. We base our analysis on the legal framework as illustrated by the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2006).  
6 The child allowance is notably higher for children born in 2008 and later (Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, 2006). Therefore, child allowances as a share of overall costs may increase in the next years.  8 
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3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 Definition of treatment approaches 
We scrutinize the impact of the Riester scheme on households’ saving propensities by means 
of a treatment analysis. In order to assess the causal effect of the reform we compare pre- and 
post-reform propensities to save for two groups, a treatment group and a control group. 
Thereby, the SOEP offers numerous possibilities for econometric analyses of the Riester 
scheme given the length of this panel and its high number of surveyed households. Since 
people might have anticipated the Riester reform and correspondingly adjusted their pre-
reform savings, we use the year 2000 and not 2001 as the pre-reform period. To cope with the 
possibility that people adjusted their savings with some delay and to address the stepwise 
increase in subsidies and required savings, we evaluate various post-reform years, from 2004 
to 2007.  
Various definitions of the treatment and the control group are considered. The 
characteristics of the treatment and the control group for all five approaches are summarized 
in Table 2. Underlying our econometric analysis always is a balanced working sample 
complying, in the pre- and in the post-reform period, with the characteristics outlined in Table 
2. Household units having different characteristics are discarded. We provide a detailed 
description of our proceedings in the appendix.  
Maybe the most straightforward possibility (Approach 1) is to assign households to the 
treatment group if all adult household members are eligible for a Riester contract, and non-
eligible households to the control group. The strength of Approach 1 is that it does not impose 
strong restrictions on the characteristics of households entering the working sample so that the 
working sample size is large. A weakness of Approach 1 is that treated and control 
households exhibit quite different personal characteristics.  
A second procedure focuses on low-income households, a target group of the Riester 
scheme. Low-income households can benefit from particularly high subsidy ratios. In 
Approach 2, households eligible for Riester with an equivalent household income below the 
average in the respective period are assigned to the treatment group. Households not eligible 
for Riester and at an income level below the mean are assigned to the control group. 
Approach 2 allows us to evaluate the impact of the Riester scheme on a target group of the 
reform, namely low-income households. Moreover, treated and control households’ economic 
situation, as determined by household income, is similar. So, both should have a similar 
propensity to save. By nature, a backdrop of Approach 2 compared to Approach 1 is a 
substantial reduction of sample size. 9 

A third option is based on the fact that Riester subsidies are higher for households with 
more children, potentially creating an extra incentive to save (Approach 3). The basic idea is 
that the additional child allowance for the second child induces an additional saving incentive 
to the treated households which potentially benefit from a particularly high saving subsidy. 
Particularly, married couples with two children in the post-period period form the treatment 
group. Married couples with one child are assigned to the control group. At a gross income 
exceeding a particular threshold, benefits from tax exemptions resulting from a Riester 
scheme may top the usual subsidy paid as allowances. This threshold is sensitive to household 
composition. Accordingly, it is not guaranteed that households with more children benefit 
from a higher subsidy (in form of tax allowances) over the entire income range. For this 
reason, the working sample is restricted to households with an income below average. This 
latter restriction makes sure that the additional child allowance does indeed increase the 
subsidy ratio of the households under investigation. 
In Approach 4, we select all households potentially eligible for a Riester contract in 
the post-reform period. We classify them conditioning upon whether the household head has 
signed a contract or not. As participating in a Riester contract is a choice, the group-
classification criterion is not exogenous. To avoid misunderstandings, instead of referring to 
treated and controls, we may better call them subscribers – eligible household heads having 
signed a Riester contract – and eligible household heads who have not signed such a contract 
in the period under consideration.  
Finally, Approach 5 is similar to Approach 4 but regards households as been treated if 
any adult household member has signed a Riester contract.  
Table 2 about here  
When commenting upon our findings, we shall concentrate on the year combinations 2000-
2004 and 2000-2005 for Approach 1-3 as well as 2000-2004, 2000-2006, and 2000-2007 
(since the uptake of Riester contracts was only surveyed in those years) for the fourth and 
fifth approach when using the SOEP data. The 2000-2004 comparison is our preferred one 
because 2005-2007 savings are possibly affected by other factors as well, such as the 
introduction of so-called Rürup pensions in 2005
7.  

7 Rürup pensions are subsidized private retirement saving contracts especially targeting people that are not 
mandatorily insured in the German pension scheme, e.g., the self-employed. Contributions are tax-deductible, 
and the accumulated capital is repaid as a monthly annuity. For details, see, e.g., the homepage of the Federal 10 
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We complement these findings with regression results based on observations from the 
SAVE Study as surveyed in 2005-2008. The relevant observation points for both datasets are 
displayed in Figure 1.  
3.2 Econometric challenges 
Our analysis might suffer from self-selection bias. For instance, the underlying working 
samples could have a different saving behavior compared to the household units being 
excluded. Then, the saving behavior of the considered households would not be representative 
for the entire population. For the approaches 1-3, we can rule out that households self-select 
into a different group between the two points of observation or that they self-select into a 
status that is not captured by our treatment or control group definitions. In these approaches, 
treatment is linked to Riester eligibility (and, therefore, to employment and marital status) and 
to household composition. It seems very unlikely that fundamental household decisions such 
as occupation, marriage, or birth of childrenare driven by considerations related to the Riester 
scheme. On the contrary, self-selection is virulent in Approach 4 and Approach 5 since the 
conclusion of a contract is voluntary. However, we apply different strategies to deal with this 
issue (described below). 
Based on the aforementioned sample classifications, we evaluate the impact of the 
Riester scheme on household saving ratios, i.e., household savings divided by household net 
income. Since our dependent variable is censored from below (respondents participating in 
both datasets do not report negative saving amounts) and as our data exhibit a panel structure, 





In Eq. (1), i identifies a specific household, t denotes the observation period with t=1 denoting 
the period before the reform. Although we consider different post-reform years, with little 
abuse of notation, t=2 always indicates the post-reform period. The coefficient i is the 
random effect, and i,t the error term. The random effect i is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed according to 
. The vector of socio-economic characteristics of 
household i in t is denoted by xi,t. The variable Ri,t distinguishes households belonging to the 
treatment and to the control group. In t=1, it is always zero. In the post reform period, for 

Ministry of Finance at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_39846/DE/BMF__Startseite/ 
Service/Glossar/B/019__Basisrente.html.   11 
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treated households Ri,2=1 while else it is zero. Hence the corresponding regression coefficient 
 mirrors the mobilization effect of the Riester scheme. In particular, >0 would indicate that 
the Riester reform has stimulated savings among treated households. N is another dummy 
variable, taking the value one if the observation refers to a post-reform year; its coefficient 
captures the evolution of saving ratios between two observation periods. Among the control 
variables we include dummies for different household types, household income, employment 
status and age of the household head, and dummy variables on repayments for consumer 
credit and home loans. 
As already mentioned, classification in our fourth and fifth approach is not strictly 
exogeneous. Saving preferences (e.g., due to risk-aversion or individual discount factors) are 
likely to be correlated with the conclusion of a Riester contract. We can expect that 
households with a higher propensity to save are more likely to sign up such a contract. 
Moreover, the Riester scheme is intended to serve as an entry to private old-age provision. 
The providers of Riester products have to go after governmental certifications for their 
products. Thus, we might find numerous households with low experience in financial affairs 
among Riester savers. In any case, these household-specific effects are potentially unobserved 
and we do not have a convincing proxy (or, alternatively, a valid instrument variable) at hand 
to deal with this endogeneity issue. Consequently, we would obtain biased results. Under the 
assumption that unobserved heterogeneity with respect to saving preferences and experience 
is time-invariant and that time paths of savings are similar, we can infer the treatment effect 





where -denotes the difference in i’s saving rates between the period after the 
reform, t=2, and before, t=1. Similarly, the vector -stands for inter-temporal changes 
in the socioeconomic covariates. The time-invariant individual effect i cancels out. Again,
>0 would suggest a stimulation effect from the reform.  
  12 
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3.3 Motivation of matching 
If the treatment variable is not independent of the background covariates, regression-based 
estimates of the treatment effect may depend on modeling choices and regression 
specifications. Particularly, if the functional relationship between the treatment variable and 
the background covariates is misspecified, estimates of the true treatment effect can be 
biased.
8 Successful matching breaks the link between the treatment variable and background 
covariates, produces data similar to a randomized experiment, and eliminates the problem of 
model/specification dependence. Accordingly, in the third place, we provide estimates of the 
average treatment effect on the treated, ATT, by using matching methods. We construct a 
sample such that the distributions of several characteristics are similar in the groups of treated 
and control units (Iacus et al., 2008). For the sample of matched units, the ATT is elicited 




where wi is the matching weight. Table 3 summarizes the matching variables: household net 
income, age of the household head, and household type. The selection of the matching 
variables is guided by previous literatures on household saving suggesting that these variables 
have a prominent effect on the saving behavior of households. An extension of the set of 
matching variables would reduce post-matching sample sizes too much. The more variables 
are considered for matching, the lower is the number of observations in the treatment and in 
the control group that have characteristics similar in all dimensions. 
Table 3 about here 
We employ a monotonic imbalance bounding class of matching methods called “Coarsened 
Exact Matching” (CEM), as recently suggested by Iacus et al. (2008). Matching is done 
without replacement. To assess the quality of the matching outcome, we compare, before and 
after matching, descriptive statistics of the matching variables in both the treatment and the 
control group. In addition, we provide two measures of imbalance suggested by Iacus et al. 
(2008). The first measure 

 Ho et al. (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the issue of model dependence together with empirical 
examples.13 

(4)  	 !


  "#"$-!"#"$ "#"$ 
gives the sum of absolute differences over all cells of a multivariate histogram. In Eq. (4), 
 "#"$denote the relative frequencies of the categorical variables lj for the treated households, 
and !"#"$for the control households. These frequencies are obtained in three steps. First, the 
number of categories for each (continuous) variable is chosen. Then, the discretized variables 
are cross-tabulated separately for the treated and the control group. Finally, the k-dimensional 
relative frequency is computed. Perfect balance across all variables is achieved if L1(f,g) = 0, 
whereas L1(f,g) = 1 indicates perfect separation. Let the relative frequencies of the matched 
dataset be denoted by f
m and g
m; one hopes to find 	 !
-	 
%!%
&, and the 
difference can be interpreted as the increase in balance achieved as a result of matching.
9  
The measure defined by (4) can also be quantified for each variable j separately, which we 
then denote by 
', allows an assessment of the variable-specific imbalance.  










is the difference in the means of variable  j  for the group of treated (mT) and control units 
(mC) matched, weighted by the matching weights assigned to each unit.
10
4 Description of the database 
4.1 Savings variables in the datasets 
Our investigation is based on two data sources, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
and the SAVE Study. The SOEP is a longitudinal study, located at the DIW Berlin (German 
Institute for Economic Research). Starting in 1984, it surveys meanwhile more than 20,000 
individuals in about 11,000 households every year.
11  

9 See Blackwell et al. (2009, p. 6). 
10 We implemented the CEM in Stata using the command cem. For details, see Blackwell et al. (2009) and 
http://gking.harvard.edu/cem/.  
11 For details, see, e.g., Wagner et al. (2007) and the SOEP homepage at http://www.diw.de/en/soep. 14 
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The SOEP contains information on regular household saving and in some years it also 
reports whether a surveyed household member has a Riester contract or not. The exact 
wording of the survey question on saving reads as follows: “Do you usually have an amount 
of money left over at the end of the month that you can save for larger purchases, emergency 
expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how much?” (see SOEP online documentation: 
http://www.diw.de/english/questionnaires/33919.html). Hence, it is asked to state usual 
amounts intended for savings, including savings for old age but not to report accidental 
savings. 
The survey question reported above has been used extensively in econometric analyses 
of household saving decisions in Germany, among others by Bauer and Sinning (2011), 
Fuchs-Schündeln (2008), Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2003), as well as Merkle and 
Zimmermann (1992). Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that savings may be under-reported 
in the SOEP data as Corneo et al. (2009) find that some respondents that claim to have a 
Riester contract declare zero savings. We therefore intend to provide substantial motivation 
for the usage of this savings variable. First, we run auxiliary regressions to find associations 
of our savings variable and well-established demographic and financial factors (the regression 
results are illustrated in the appendix). This plausibility check is in line with Alessie and 
Lusardi (1997) who also address the issue of measurement error in saving variables. Similar 
to them (and to the empirical literature on private savings), we find that the probability of 
declaring positive savings and the savings ratio increase with income and are higher for better 
educated households. The existence of children in the household has a negative association 
with savings. Furthermore, we are able to trace the non-linear effect of age on savings.  
Second, we have a closer look on the Riester contract information contained in the 
dataset. Between the waves in which the SOEP asked whether the respondent has concluded a 
Riester contract, namely 2004, 2006, and 2007, we identify two groups of switchers. These 
are households with people who concluded a contract in between or with people who changed 
their response from yes to no in between. The latter group is most likely composed of people 
who have recalled an existing contract. This group is notably smaller than the group of those 
switching into a contract. Thus, we use the cross-section observations of 2004, 2006, and 
2007 to regress the probability to save on the two switching indicators (whether the household 
switched into or out of a Riester contract). The results are displayed in Table A2 (appendix) 
and reveal two interesting aspects: In two of three year combinations, switching into a Riester 
contract is significantly associated with a higher probability to save. These associations are 
even robust against the inclusion of the set of control variables used in the proceeding 15 
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plausibility check. Also, we find in one year combination a negative and highly significant 
association between positive savings and switching out of a contract. Of course, these 
rudimentary correlation checks do not anticipate the results of the more elaborated empirical 
analyses in the following section. However, they give an important hint. If Riester savings 
were systematically neglected by the survey respondents, the probability to declare positive 
savings should be unaffected by the conclusion of a Riester contract.  
Nevertheless, we take concerns about the quality of the saving variables in the SOEP 
seriously. Therefore, we enrich our analysis by using a second German panel database, the 
SAVE Study. Similarly to the SOEP, the SAVE data include a one-shot savings measure 
(overall amount saved in the previous year) and information on Riester contracts.
12 The 
questioning in SAVE has two advantages. First, the wording of the question is more explicit 
since it makes use of the term “saved” (instead of the more imprecise formulation in the 
SOEP questionnaire: “…amount of money left over […] that you can save …”). Second, the 
savings variable is asked after a longer list of questions on saving behavior in which different 
saving vehicles (e.g., life-insurance contracts) are explicitly named. We would therefore 
expect that the respondents are adequately prepared to give reliable estimates of their total 
savings.  
To contrast the savings behavior of our data with those of the German population, we 
calculate mean savings ratios of the two datasets by year for all households in the datasets 
(using household weights to improve representativeness and excluding observations with 
missing information or unrealistically high saving rates of 100 percent and more).  
Table 4 about here 
As presented in the upper part of Table 4, the mean calculated saving ratios in both samples 
are very close. Starting at a level of 8.7 percent in 2000 (SOEP), we observe values between 
6.6 and 7.9 percent between 2004 and 2007 (both datasets). Interestingly, mean savings ratios 
obtained from SAVE go a little below those obtained from the SOEP in all periods. 
Effectively, we cannot claim representativeness of these figures given missing information, 
censoring of the savings variables and a potential under-representativeness of income-rich 
households in the data. In fact, we intend to show that the two savings variables basically 
survey the same thing.   

12 On the SAVE Study see Börsch-Supan et al. (2008a). Essig (2005) discusses different savings measures and 
the reliability of the one-shot savings measure in the SAVE data. For further details, refer also to the SAVE 
questionnaires at the MEA homepage http://www.mea.uni-mannheim.de.  16 
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  Our last step to give further insights in the savings variables we use is a comparison 
with the national accounts. Until here, we have focused on the saving ratio of each household 
so that the saving ratio of an income-poor household has been treated the same as the saving 
ratio of an income-rich household (if both households share the same household weight). 
Indeed, national accounts calculate saving ratios out of aggregated income and expenditure. 
Thus, the savings ratio of an income-rich household would receive a higher weight. 
Therefore, we calculate weighted incomes and savings amounts separately by year and dataset 
to receive aggregated saving ratios. These figures are displayed in the lower part of Table 4. 
We see that savings ratios increase in all years and reach a level of about nine percent in the 
SOEP and about eight percent in SAVE, respectively. Certainly, it is necessary to be aware 
that savings in national accounts and in our analysis differ in definition and methodology (as 
regards, e.g., household debt or asset decumulation). However, it is apparent that the savings 
variables that we take from the datasets are indeed applicable for our analysis.   
Throughout the empirical analysis, we have to focus on the SOEP-based estimates 
because the number of households repeatedly participating in the SAVE Study is substantially 
smaller compared to the SOEP. In particular, sample sizes are not sufficient to ensure reliable 
matching results for the SAVE database. Another limitation of SAVE is that in the year 2000 
– the year before the Riester reform – that database was still in its experimental stage. Hence, 
SAVE-based before-after reform comparisons cannot be taken seriously. Only an assessment 
of the impact of the so-called Riester steps on household savings is feasible, i.e., evaluations 
of the impact of the intertemporal rise in monetary incentives – higher allowances and tax 
deductions, but also higher required minimum savings efforts – on household savings. Taken 
these limitations together, we end up with regression results of two approaches (Approach 1 
and Approach 5) in four year combinations (2005-2007, 2005-2008, 2006-2007, 2006-2008).  
4.2 Saving behavior in treatment and control groups
Table 5 (SOEP) and Table 6 (SAVE) portrait the intertemporal variation of saving rates and 
also of the fraction of households with positive savings. All results are decomposed by 
treatment approach, post-reform period and dataset. Particularly, for the saving rate, five 
values are provided, each referring to a particular percentile (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th) of 
the ordered distribution of saving rates. All the estimates are derived by assigning the 
households to the treatment and control group in a particular post-reform period and then 
looking back at the pre-reform period.  17 
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Table 5 about here 
Beginning with the Approaches 3-5 in the SOEP, the saving rates of treatment and control 
groups in the year 2000 are similarly distributed. For instance, 58 percent of the treatment 
subsample (Approach 3) in 2000 report positive savings with an unconditional mean saving 
ratio of 5.3 percent. The control group shows positive savings in 60 percent of the cases and 
has an unconditional mean saving ratio of 5.2 percent (both figures taken from the 2000-2004 
comparison). Looking at the saving ratios of the different percentiles reveals further 
similarities.  
Approach 1 and Approach 2 require a more detailed view. In both approaches, we 
observe similar conditional mean saving ratios and a comparable saving behavior at the lower 
and higher tails of the distribution (10th and 25th percentile as well as the 90th percentile in 
three of four year combinations). However, the fraction of saving households is notably larger 
in the treatment groups.    
Table 6 about here 
With SAVE, we can only compare the saving behavior of treated and control households in 
Approach 1 and Approach 5. In the first approach, the fractions of saving households and the 
mean saving ratios (conditional and unconditional) are close-by. In total, we observe similar 
distribution of saving ratios. On the contrary, saving ratios between households in treatment 
and control group differ more notably in the fifth approach. The fraction of saving households 
is remarkably low in the control group.  
One may argue that differences in saving behavior in SOEP and SAVE indicate that at 
least one dataset does not get the level of savings exactly right. However, to infer the 
treatment effect it suffices that we estimate without systematic biases the differential changes 
in saving rates (see Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003).  
4.3 Time effects and group composition 
To suitably identify treatment effects, we have to ensure that time effects are common across 
groups and that the composition of treatment and control groups is not affected by changes in 
covariates we cannot control for. As before, we start with discussing these aspects for the 18 
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more homogeneous subsamples in the Approaches 3-5. There is no reason to argue that macro 
effects between the observation points could have affected treatment and control groups in a 
different manner. Since we use age, employment status, household type, income, and debt 
repayments as control variables, we state that the most influential observable factors are 
adequately accounted for. In addition, we believe that unobservable factors (such as saving 
preferences) are similarly distributed between the treatment and control samples in the third 
approach, and can be taken as time-invariant for the Approaches 4 and 5.  
This issue is more complex in the first two approaches. By definition, employment 
states are crucial for the assignment of the subgroups in these two approaches. However, we 
capture changes in the economic environment by controlling for household income and debt 
repayments. Moreover, the Rürup pension scheme with a possibly stronger impact on self-
employed (which we mostly find in the control groups) was only introduced in 2005 and 
started slowly.
13 Finally, unobserved factors with a potential influence on savings are 
accounted for by taking first-differences. In Table A3 (SOEP) and A4 (SAVE) in the 
appendix, we display the compositions of treatment and control groups for all approaches, all 
year-combinations, and all relevant covariates in detail. 
5 Results 
5.1 Panel regressions: random-effects and first-differences 
For each of our five approaches and intertemporal comparisons, three model specifications are 
estimated. The model specifications differ by the set of control variables. For each 
intertemporal comparison, the first specification contains the estimates pertaining to a 
regression specification without any further control variable. In the second specification, basic 
socio-demographic household characteristics are included as controls. The third specification 
uses the full set of control variables which comprises household types, age and employment 
type of the head of household, income, and loan repayments. Depending on the different 
approaches, treatment can be linked to a certain employment type (for instance, bluecollar 
workers are eligible so that we would not find a household in which the household head’s 
employment status is bluecollar worker in the control group of the first approach), so that the 
basic set of controls (second specification) includes all covariates that are not used to 
distinguish between treatment and control groups.  

13 With about 153,200 contracts in 2005 (German Bundestag, 2008). 19 
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Table 7 about here 
The treatment coefficients are of special interest for our purposes. Since the random-effects 
regressions build on a tobit model, the regression coefficients cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effects. Therefore, we calculate marginal effects and concentrate on the marginal 
effect of the treatment dummy on the unconditional expected value of the savings ratio 
(displayed in Table 7).  
The results are not unambiguous. While we find insignificant treatment effects in all 
specifications of Approach 3 and in most specifications of Approach 4 and Approach 5, 
savings appear to respond to treatment in some specifications of the first two approaches 
(mostly in 2000-2005 comparisons). Among the control variables, household composition, 
unemployment, income, and loan repayments have a robust effect on saving rates (results not 
reported).  
However, we have already discussed the limitations of the different approaches in the 
third section. Even if we argue that households do not self-select into or out of the treatment 
groups, we have to point out that unobserved characteristics of the control groups (e.g., being 
self-employed) in the first and second approach are possibly correlated with saving 
preferences. Similarly, treatment households in the fourth and fifth approach (those with 
concluded contracts) are likely to differ in their savings behavior from households who 
refused to conclude such a contract. Therefore, we believe that the third approach is indeed 
the most reliable one and that positive treatment effects in the remaining approaches are 
possibly influenced by self-selection and endogeneity bias.   
In the first-differences regressions, the treatment coefficients can directly be 
interpreted as the marginal effect of the treatment status on the saving ratio. The results 
displayed in Table 8 reveal a clear picture. Treatment is insignificant in all specifications. We 
interpret these findings as strong evidence against the effectiveness to mobilize private 
savings in the treatment groups under consideration. Moreover, since the first-differences 
results are not driven by (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity, we prefer them to the 
(mixed) random-effects results discussed in the previous subsection. 
The influence of the control variables is as expected. As before, household 
composition, income, unemployment, and debt repayments affect saving decisions (results not 
reported).  20 
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Table 8 about here
5.2 Results from matching  
To allow an assessment of the degree of imbalance in the original unmatched data and the 
data after matching, for each of our five approaches, Table 9 reports summary statistics 
allowing, for each matching variable, an assessment of the degree of imbalance before and 
after matching.  
Table 9 about here
By way of an example, consider Approach 1 when the inter-temporal comparison refers to 
periods 2000 and 2005. For each of the matching variables, the columns entitled 
) (
1




give the estimates of the variable-specific imbalance measures after and before matching. In 
the adjacent columns, imbalances between the treated and controls, the minimum, the three 
quantile means, and the maximum are reported. Thus, the value 0.080 appearing in column “
) (
1
j L , after” for the variable age indicates a moderate imbalance between the treat and control 
units matched, which is substantially lower than the estimate 0.311 for the non-matched 
observations that appears in column “
) (
1
j L , before”. Also the second measure, 
) (
1
j I , points to a 
substantial decrease of imbalance for the variable age – as shown by the value –0.248 for the 
matched units as compared to -3.138 for the units before matching. Next to the variable-
specific imbalance measures we report the change in the global imbalance measure,  1 L Δ , 
which indicates that the matching algorithm was effective in increasing the balance over all 
the matching variables. It is transparent that the matching procedure has been effective in 
reducing the global imbalance across all variables as well as variable specific imbalances. 
This applies to all approaches.  
We are now in a position to inspect whether our previous conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the Riester scheme hold for the matched units. The results are summarized in 
the column Average treatment effect in Table 10. The treatment effect is insignificant in nine 
out of twelve cases. Only in three cases the treatment effect is significant and carries the 
correct sign (Approach 1 and Approach 2 only). On the contrary, treatment cannot explain 
private savings in all year-combinations of the Approach 3-5. Hence, also for the units 21 
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matched we cannot identify a stimulating effect of the Riester scheme on the propensity to 
save in most of the cases. 
A limitation of the matching approach is that it leads to small sample sizes. Small 
samples raise the question of whether the conclusions drawn from the matching approach are 
representative for the underlying overall population. This explains why it was useful to 
combine the matching approach with a panel regression analysis, so as to assess the 
robustness of the empirical results. 
Table 10 about here 
5.3 Results from SAVE 
As mentioned above, the SOEP saving variable is possibly an imperfect measure of a 
household’s savings. Therefore, we have conducted a regression analysis using a second 
dataset, the SAVE Study. While the SAVE Study was explicitly designed to investigate 
saving behavior, it only allows for an analysis of the effectiveness of the so-called Riester 
steps, i.e. the increase of the subsidy rate after 2005.  
The results from random-effects panel regressions based on the SAVE data are 
exhibited in Table 11. Those results are in line with those obtained applying the same 
methodology to the SOEP data (Table 4). As shown in Table 11, we find insignificant 
treatment effects in all specifications of Approach 1 and Approach 5.  
Table 11 about here 
Table 11 displays results from first-differences which are in line with the random-effects 
result discussed before. In both approaches and all specifications, treatment does not show a 
significant impact on savings. Our previous conclusion from the SOEP sample that Riester 
subsidies have no detectable mobilization effects on private savings can therefore be enriched 
with the SAVE results. Mostly insignificant treatment effects that we find by comparing 
SOEP savings before and after the introduction of the reform come along with insignificant 
treatment effects that we find by comparing savings in SAVE along the progression of the 
reform.   
  22 
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6 Concluding remarks 
The Riester scheme is the central pillar of governmental promotion of private retirement 
saving in Germany. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive treatment analysis of the 
Riester scheme so as to assess its effectiveness in raising private household savings. The 
introduction of the Riester allowances and tax deductions can be interpreted as a natural 
experiment and we investigate how the savings of treated household have evolved as 
compared to the savings of control households. In order to check the robustness of our results, 
we employ panel regressions and matching methods to reduce problems of unobserved 
heterogeneity and sample selection bias. Several model specifications as well as time periods 
are examined and two datasets are used, the German SOEP and the SAVE Study. 
  We provide a detailed discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the different 
treatment approaches we apply and we critically examine the reliability of the savings 
variables contained in the two datasets we use.  
Despite the variety of estimation methods and datasets, the obtained results are fairly 
stable. The effect of the Riester scheme on mobilizing private savings is mostly insignificant. 
This holds for the first-differences regressions and matching results of all treatment 
approaches, year combinations, and model specifications as well as for most random-effects 
results. In some random-effects specifications, we find indeed significantly positive treatment 
effects which we attribute to self-selection and endogeneity bias. Our results are similar for 
evaluations of the reform itself (comparing savings before and after the introduction of the 
reform with SOEP data) and of the progression of the reform steps (comparing savings at 
different points in time during the reform with SAVE data).  
Apparently, many private households that would have saved also in the absence of the 
Riester scheme simply allocated some of their savings to Riester contracts. In this way, those 
households can improve their future living standards without the pain of reducing current 
consumption. The likely counterpart of those windfall gains is an increase in public debt, 
which calls for larger primary surpluses in the future. This suggests that a major effect of the 
Riester scheme is to substitute future increases in social security contributions with future tax 
increases. 
The ineffectiveness of saving incentives may be more pronounced in Germany than in 
other countries. German households traditionally display a relatively high saving rate. 
Furthermore, all compulsorily insured persons regularly receive notification about the likely 
amount of pension benefit that they are going to receive as a retiree. Alternative long-term 
financial instruments, e.g., life insurance, are common and well known by the population. In 23 
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such a situation, the rationale for subsidizing certified retirement plans is rather weak. Our 
empirical results corroborate the view that there may be better uses of taxpayer money for 
old-age provision than the Riester scheme. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Fiscal costs of the Riester scheme 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
# Riester contracts  
(in mio.) 
3.37 3.92  4.19  5.63  8.05  10.76  12.15 
Allowances 
 (in mio. Euro) 
146.8 173.9  384.9  521.9 1,114.3 1,488.9 2,241.8
Tax deductions  
(in mio. Euro) 
38.5 53.5 107.8 147.2 314.3 420.1 632.4
Total subsidies  
(in mio. Euro) 
185.3 227.4  492.7  669.1 1,428.6 1,909.0 2,874.2
Note. Italic figures are extrapolations based on the figures of the previous years. Source: Number of Riester contracts: Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (http://www.bmas.bund.de); allowances/tax deductions: Federal Statistical Office 
(2009), Stolz and Rieckhoff (2008). 
Table 2. Definitions of treatment and control group 
Approach Treatment  group  Control  group 
1  Households eligible for Riester  Households not eligible for Riester 
2  Households eligible for Riester 
Equivalent income below mean 
Households not eligible for Riester  
Equivalent income below mean 
3  Two married adults, two children 
Equivalent income below mean 
Two married adults, one child 
Equivalent income below mean 
4  Household head with a Riester contract 
Equivalent income below mean 
Household head without a Riester contract but eligible  
Equivalent income below mean  
5  Household with a Riester contract 
Equivalent income below mean 
Household without a Riester contract but eligible 
Equivalent income below mean 
Note. Own  illustration. 
Table 3. Matching variables and their coarsened categories 
Matching Approach 













0-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4; 
4-5; 5-6; 6-8; 8-10; 
10-12; 12-14; 14-16 
0-1; 1-1.5, 1.5-2; 2-
2.5; 2,5-3; 3-4; 4-5; 
5-6; 6-8 
0-1; 1-1.5; 1-5-2; 2-
2.5; 2.5-3; 3-4 
0-1; 1-1.5, 1.5-2; 2-





0-20; 20-30; 30-35; 
35-40; 40-45; 45-50; 
50-55; 55-60 
0-20; 20-30; 30-35; 
35-40; 40-45; 45-50; 
50-55; 55-60 
0-20; 20-30; 30-35; 
35-40; 40-45; 45-50; 
50-55; 55-60 
0-20; 20-30; 30-35; 
35-40; 40-45; 45-50; 
50-55; 55-60 
Note. Own  illustration. HH-type 1: singles; HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 4: 
couples with children aged 16 and younger; HH-type 5: couples with cohabiting children aged older than 16; HH-type 6: 
couples with younger and older children. 29 
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Table 4. Saving ratios in the two datasets and in the national accounts
  2000  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Not  aggregated        
SOEP  8.68  7.43 7.89 7.58 7.40 
SAVE  ---  7.01 6.89 6.76 6.98 
        
Aggregated        
SOEP  9.68  8.90 9.26 9.21 9.34 
SAVE  ---  7.04 7.96 7.76 8.10 
National  accounts  9.2  10.4 10.5 10.6 10.8 
        
Note. Savings taken from SAVE data refer to the previous year. Source: SOEP, SAVE, Federal Statistical Office at 
http://www.destatis.de.  
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Mean saving ratio  Saving ratio by percentile of ordered 
saving rates






Treat 0.641 7.687 11.985  4.998  11.255 20.011 
Control 0.441  6.488  14.718  0.000  9.661  20.004 
2004 
Treat 0.606 7.053 11.637  4.344  10.493 18.657 
Control 0.392  5.381  13.710  0.000  7.926  16.667 
2000 
Treat 0.644 7.763 12.048  5.000  11.362 20.043 
Control 0.423  5.762  13.612  0.000  8.334  18.182 
2005 
Treat 0.626 7.393 11.816  4.706  10.870 19.201 
Control 0.368  4.522  12.284  0.000  5.470  14.286 
2 
2000 
Treat 0.497 4.744  9.553  0.000  7.419  13.043 
Control  0.302  3.149  10.432  0.000 3.392 9.871 
2004 
Treat 0.451 4.161  9.230  0.000  6.766  12.327 
Control 0.292  2.667  9.120  0.000  3.261  11.249 
2000 
Treat 0.511 5.102  9.988  1.757  7.998  13.512 
Control 0.300  3.154  10.513  0.000  2.942  12.171 
2005 
Treat 0.466 4.634  9.943  0.000  7.003  13.636 
Control  0.260  2.099 8.074  0.000 2.069 7.913 
3 
2000 
Treat 0.577 5.267  9.127  3.657  8.001  13.371 
Control 0.598  5.218  8.730  3.570  7.697  12.728 
2004 
Treat 0.557 4.671  8.385  2.759  7.862  12.931 
Control 0.512  4.391  8.581  1.802  7.029  11.433 
2000 
Treat 0.596 5.606  9.404  4.052  8.977  13.406 
Control 0.557  5.146  9.231  2.967  7.894  12.821 
2005 
Treat 0.551 5.014  9.096  2.746  7.971  13.706 
Control 0.511  4.724  9.252  1.920  7.143  13.310 
4 
2000 
Treat 0.539 4.828  8.956  2.086  8.022  12.501 
Control 0.497  4.797  9.647  0.000  7.406  13.260 
2004 
Treat 0.477 3.945  8.264  0.000  6.250  10.862 
Control 0.452  4.235  9.379  0.000  6.897  12.763 
2000 
Treat 0.552 5.394  9.775  3.092  8.800  13.157 
Control 0.511  5.081  9.951  1.724  7.977  13.888 
2006 
Treat 0.488 4.785  9.809  0.000  7.237  13.976 
Control 0.437  4.101  9.395  0.000  6.561  12.590 
2000 
Treat 0.583 5.804  9.962  3.572  8.751  14.585 
Control 0.499  4.847  9.721  0.000  7.738  13.406 
2007 
Treat 0.530 4.798  9.045  2.166  8.084  13.401 
Control 0.431  3.685  8.551  0.000  5.999  11.737 
5 
2000 
Treat 0.566 4.948  8.736  2.407  7.793  12.870 
Control 0.492  4.780  9.722  0.000  7.406  13.157 
2004 
Treat 0.487 4.389  9.006  0.000  6.701  12.387 
Control 0.447  4.149  9.277  0.000  6.818  12.232 
2000 
Treat 0.553 5.220  9.442  2.943  8.500  13.441 
Control 0.506  5.105  10.081  1.540  8.001  13.634 
2006 
Treat 0.507 4.663  9.193  1.656  7.209  13.514 
Control 0.426  4.143  9.728  0.000  6.452  12.821 
2000 
Treat 0.568 5.573  9.809  3.338  8.695  13.760 
Control 0.485  4.648  9.585  0.000  7.406  13.329 
2007 
Treat 0.523 4.567  8.726  2.039  7.769  13.159 
Control 0.417  3.643  8.738  0.000  5.882  11.765 
Note. Own calculations. Saving ratios for 10
th and 25
th percentile not reported because they are zero in all rows. Data source: 
SOEP 2000 and 2004-2007. 
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Mean saving ratio  Saving ratio by percentile of ordered 
saving rates 
uncond. cond.  50th  75th  90th 
1 
2005  Treat 0.460  5.252 11.426  0.000 7.160  15.486 
Control 0.500  5.126 10.250  1.563 7.632  13.976 
2007 
Treat 0.449  5.137 11.434  0.000 6.966  16.381 
Control 0.323  3.772 11.656  0.000 4.147  13.754 
2005 
Treat 0.488  5.518 11.298  0.000 8.098  15.654 
Control 0.450  6.230 13.851  0.000 8.374  17.734 
2008 
Treat 0.488  4.890 10.011  0.000 7.927  14.589 
Control 0.367  5.736 15.653  0.000 8.333  17.647 
2006 
Treat 0.499  6.076 12.173  0.121 8.909  17.460 
Control 0.437  5.766 13.195  0.000 8.374  21.244 
2007 
Treat 0.482  5.352 11.100  0.000 8.294  16.667 
Control 0.392  4.652 11.854  0.000 7.399  14.621 
2006 
Treat 0.489  5.935 12.129  0.000 8.632  17.888 
Control 0.429  5.935 13.828  0.000 8.379  21.714 
2008 
Treat 0.489  5.052 10.339  0.000 7.884  15.096 
Control 0.359  5.252 14.618  0.000 5.480  17.660 
5 
2005 
Treat 0.476  4.589 11.426  0.000 9.100  16.167 
Control 0.256  1.559 10.250  0.000 0.833 5.651 
2007 
Treat 0.450  4.855 11.434  0.000 6.944  15.238 
Control 0.246  2.274 11.656  0.000 0.208 7.292 
2005 
Treat 0.484  4.368 11.298  0.093 7.866  13.287 
Control 0.279  2.911 13.851  0.000 2.741  10.163 
2008 
Treat 0.564  4.193 10.011  1.249 5.409  13.519 
Control 0.213  2.111 15.653  0.000 0.000 8.545 
2006 
Treat 0.464  4.875 12.173  0.000 5.652  10.625 
Control 0.301  2.978 13.195  0.000 2.755 9.450 
2007 
Treat 0.425  3.924 11.100  0.000 6.213  11.925 
Control 0.313  2.837 11.854  0.000 2.317 8.721 
2006 
Treat 0.494  5.107 12.129  0.217 6.528  10.482 
Control 0.287  2.891 13.828  0.000 2.217 8.572 
2008 
Treat 0.487  3.961 10.339  0.128 5.792  13.526 
Control 0.247  2.674 14.618  0.000 0.556 9.187 
Note.  Own calculations. Calculations based on five multiply imputed datasets. Saving ratios for 10
th and 25
th percentile not 
reported because they are zero in all rows. Data source: SAVE 2005-2008.  32 
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Table 7. Random-effects tobit regressions (marginal effects) 
   Specification 







(0.613) (0.604) (0.626) 
Households 4,291  [95.67] 




(0.685) (0.680) (0.702) 





* 0.457 0.463 
(0.621) (0.614) (0.634) 
Households 2,027  [94.77] 




(0.733) (0.723) (0.744) 




0.399 -0.485  -0.591 
(0.428) (0.428) (0.437) 
Households 755  [66.09] 
00-05  Treatment  0.176 -0.568  -0.610 
(0.460) (0.469) (0.483) 




-0.161  -0.041 
(0.373)  (0.368) 
Households 1,862  [13.05] 
00-06 
Treatment 
0.608  0.251 
(0.387)  (0.360) 






(0.383)  (0.363) 




0.143  0.217 
(0.345)  (0.339) 




**   0.263 
(0.362)  (0.335) 




**   0.425 
(0.339)  (0.320) 
Households 1,499  [31.35] 
Note. (1): basic specification; (2): reduced set of controls; (3): full set of 
controls.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Fraction of 
treated households in brackets. Marginal effects for the unconditional expected value 
of savings ratio. Data source: SOEP. 33 
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Table 8. First-differences regression results (marginal effects) 
   Specification 
Approach  Periods   (1) (2) (3) 
1 
00-04 Treatment  0.473 0.219 -0.097 
(0.691) (0.677) (0.698) 
00-05 Treatment  0.870 0.839 0.583 
(0.759) (0.744) (0.769) 
2 
00-04 Treatment  -0.101 -0.154 0.034 
(0.684) (0.681) (0.710) 
00-05 Treatment  0.587 0.667 1.060 
(0.798) (0.795) (0.835) 
3 
00-04 Treatment  0.231 0.071 -0.033 
(0.513) (0.529) (0.537) 
00-05 Treatment  -0.170 -0.096 -0.114 
(0.550) (0.576) (0.594) 
4 
00-04 Treatment  -0.321  -0.320 
(0.469)  (0.466) 
00-06 Treatment  0.370  0.240 
(0.455)  (0.452) 
00-07 Treatment 
0.156  0.108 
(0.447)  (0.447) 
5 
00-04 Treatment 
0.072  0.073 
(0.421)  (0.419) 
00-06 Treatment 
0.405  0.326 
(0.426)  (0.425) 
00-07 Treatment 
-0.000  -0.021 
(0.398)  (0.401) 
Note. Linear model. (1): basic specification; (2): reduced set of controls; (3): full set of controls.*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: see Table 5. 
Data source: SOEP. 34 
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j I Between-group differences by quantiles 
after before after before  0  25  50  75  100 
Approach 1 
2000 vs 2004 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.290 0.000 -0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.310 0.000 -0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.088 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.093 0.000 -0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.118 0.000 -0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.169 0.331 0.033 0.511 0.000 -0.014 0.044 0.000 -1.102 
    2004 0.211 0.389 0.051 0.771 -0.010 0.093 -0.069 0.325 0.605 
  Age  2000 0.206 0.197 -0.244  -1.710  -3.000  -1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 1 
2000 vs 2005 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.261 0.000 -0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.332 0.000 -0.332 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.102 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.117 0.000 -0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.135 0.000 -0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.180 0.344 0.028 0.545 -0.053 0.110 0.088 -0.033 0.044 
    2005 0.244 0.433 0.070 0.809 0.000 0.149 -0.117 0.190 -0.778 
  Age  2000 0.080 0.239 -0.248  -3.138  -2.000 0.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 
Approach 2
2000 vs 2004 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.261 0.000 -0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.287 0.000 -0.287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.350 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.102 0.000 -0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.152 0.000 -0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.109 0.374 0.031 0.555 0.000 0.104 0.028 0.009 0.804 
    2004 0.170 0.452 0.027 0.793 -0.002  -0.010 0.174 -0.023 0.223 
  Age  2000 0.093 0.249 -0.141  -2.571  -3.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 
Approach 2 
2000 vs 2005 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.253 0.000 -0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.314 0.000 -0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.270 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.148 0.000 -0.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.151 0.000 -0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.199 0.355 0.015 0.591 -0.055 0.002 0.138 -0.166 0.220 
    2005 0.130 0.461 0.018 0.808 0.000 0.004 0.100 -0.029  -0.170 
  Age  2000 0.109 0.291 -0.352  -4.490  -2.000 0.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 
Table continues 








j I Between-group differences by quantiles 
after before after before  0  25  50  75  100 
Approach 3
2000 vs 2004 
HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.129 
HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.220 0.000 -0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.334 0.000 -0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.205 0.225 0.026 0.159 0.099 0.017 -0.094 0.016 -0.358 
    2004 0.211 0.305 0.051 0.394 -0.406  -0.004 0.002 0.096 -0.004 
  Age  2000  0.141  0.292 -0.334 -3.723 -2.000 -1.000 -1.000 0.000  0.000 
Approach 3
2000 vs 2005 
HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.144 
HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.202 0.000 -0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2005 0.000 0.408 0.000 -0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.057 0.000 -0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2005 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.141 0.155 0.015 0.118 0.121 0.028 -0.044 0.000 0.099 
    2005 0.267 0.311 0.054 0.404 -0.337  -0.057  -0.015 0.166 0.600 
  Age  2000 0.142 0.320 -0.329  -4.908  -4.000 0.000 0.000 -2.000 0.000 
Approach 4
2000 vs 2004 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.045 0.000 -0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.030 0.000 -0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.198 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.035 0.000 -0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.045 0.000 -0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.036 0.000 -0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.052 0.000 -0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.024 0.000 -0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.126 0.133 0.000 0.099 0.110 0.087 0.000 0.036 -0.389 
    2004 0.097 0.110 0.027 0.115 0.110 -0.050 0.047 0.014 -0.122 
  Age  2000  0.065 0.123 -0.044 -0.594 -1.000 1.000 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 
Approach 4 
2000 vs 2006 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.053 0.000 -0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2006 0.000 0.047 0.000 -0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.167 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2006 0.000 0.062 0.000 -0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.032 0.000 -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.043 0.000 -0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.049 0.000 -0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000  0.078 0.114 -0.005 0.124 0.028 0.081 -0.015 0.000 -0.148 
    2006 0.039 0.148 -0.009 0.220 0.106 -0.011 0.000 -0.002  -0.059 
  Age  2000 0.092 0.116 -0.011  -1.703 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 
Approach 4 
2000 vs 2007 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.060 0.000 -0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2007 0.000 0.083 0.000 -0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.192 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2007 0.000 0.041 0.000 -0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.033 0.000 -0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.033 0.000 -0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.032 0.000 -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.090 0.132 -0.023 0.126 0.028 0.003 -0.005 0.012 0.032 
    2007 0.055 0.163 0.001 0.245 0.084 0.000 0.020 0.033 -0.050 
  Age  2000 0.096 0.111 -0.007  -2.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 








j I Between-group differences by quantiles 
after before after before  0  25  50  75  100 
Approach 5 
2000 vs 2004 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.065 0.000 -0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2004 0.000 0.064 0.000 -0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.125 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.036 0.000 -0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2004 0.000 0.038 0.000 -0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.018 0.000 -0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.019 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.017 0.000 -0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2004 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.119 0.141 -0.010 0.159 0.110 0.013 -0.005  -0.055  -0.389 
    2004 0.085 0.129 0.015 0.207 0.110 0.078 0.047 -0.016  -0.122 
  Age  2000  0.051 0.100 -0.114 -0.071 -1.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 5 
2000 vs 2006 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.057 0.000 -0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2006 0.000 0.078 0.000 -0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.153 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.022 0.000 -0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.000 0.073 0.000 -0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.019 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.013 0.000 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.034 0.000 -0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2006 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.057 0.118 0.002 0.161 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.148 
    2006 0.052 0.191 0.000 0.338 0.106 -0.046 0.000 -0.019 0.051 
  Age  2000 0.061 0.107 0.028 -1.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 5 
2000 vs 2007 
HH-type  1  2000 0.000 0.075 0.000 -0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  2007 0.000 0.123 0.000 -0.123 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 L Δ = 0.146 
HH-type  2  2000 0.000 0.015 0.000 -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2007 0.000 0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  3  2000 0.000 0.035 0.000 -0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  4  2000 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  5  2000 0.000 0.028 0.000 -0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  HH-type  6  2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    2007 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Income  2000 0.080 0.160 -0.019 0.209 0.000 -0.061  -0.005  -0.032 0.032 
    2007 0.091 0.224 0.009 0.412 0.084 0.004 0.006 0.000 -0.813 
  Age  2000 0.056 0.101 0.005 -1.826 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 
Note. Own calculations. Note. HH-type 1: singles; HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 4: 
couples with children aged 16 and younger; HH-type 5: couples with cohabiting children aged older than 16; HH-type 6: 
couples with younger and older children. Own calculations based on SOEP data, waves 2000 and 2004-2007. Data source: 
SOEP.  37 
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Table 10. Treatment effects for matched units 






2000 vs. 2004 
treat 1,078  1.997
**
control 144  (0.814) 
2000 vs. 2005 
treat 894  2.084
**
control 125  (0.954) 
2 
2000 vs. 2004 
treat 321  -0.134 
control  81 (1.058) 
2000 vs. 2005 
treat  310 3.168
***
control  72 (1.184) 
3 
2000 vs. 2004 
treat  251 -0.320 
control  139 (0.788) 
2000 vs. 2005 
treat  220 -1.477 
control  102 (0.793) 
4 
2000 vs. 2004 
treat 195  0.137 
control 695  (0.600) 
2000 vs. 2006 
treat 263  0.307 
control 604  (0.586) 
2000 vs. 2007 
treat 266  -0.152 
control 504  (0.550) 
5 
2000 vs. 2004 
treat 250  0.201 
control 732  (0.539) 
2000 vs. 2006 
treat 316  0.230 
control 622  (0.556) 
2000 vs. 2007 
treat 350  -0.669 




* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data source: 
SOEP.
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Table 11. Random-effects tobit regressions (marginal effects): SAVE data 
   Specification 
Approach 1 (1) (2)  (3) 
05-07  Treatment  1.806 1.403  2.109 
(1.515) (1.498)  (1.559) 
Households 346  [88.44] 
05-08  Treatment  0.441 0.351  1.367 
(1.398) (1.430)  (1.487) 
Households 318  [89.62] 
06-07  Treatment  0.886 0.303  0.389 
(0.904) (0.899)  (0.952) 
Households 684  [82.89] 
06-08  Treatment  0.770 0.138  0.428 
(0.942) (0.963)  (1.004) 
Households 598  [83.44] 
Approach 5 
05-07  Treatment  1.512  ---  1.112 
(1.277) (1.165) 
Households 143  [26.57] 
05-08  Treatment  2.806  ---  2.706 
(1.714) (1.776) 
Households 120  [27.50] 




(0.996)  (0.863) 
Households 250  [29.20] 
06-08  Treatment  2.146  ---  1.766 
(1.390) (1.860) 
Households 201  [31.84] 
Note. Savings refer to the previous year.  (1): basic specification; (2): reduced 
set of controls; (3): full set of controls.
*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Fraction of treated households in brackets. Calculations 
based on five multiply imputed datasets in accordance with Rubin (1987). 
Data source: SAVE.   39 
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Table 12. First-differences results: SAVE data 
   Specification 
Approach 1 (1) (2)  (3) 
05-07  Treatment  1.238 0.589  0.655 
(1.829) (1.898)  (1.977) 
Households 346  [88.44] 
05-08  Treatment  -0.135 -0.823  0.360 
(1.925) (1.961)  (1.995) 
Households 318  [89.62] 
06-07  Treatment  0.390 0.438  0.350 
(1.143) (1.138)  (1.164) 
Households 684  [82.89] 
06-08  Treatment  -0.201 -0.063  0.204 
(1.227) (1.247)  (1.288) 
Households 598  [83.44] 
Approach 5 
05-07  Treatment  -0.450  ---  -0.634 
(1.489) (1.603) 
Households 143  [26.57] 
05-08  Treatment  0.625  ---  1.203 
(1.829) (2.030) 
Households 120  [27.50] 
06-07  Treatment  -0.809  ---  -0.524 
(1.497) (1.554) 
Households 250  [29.20] 
06-08  Treatment  -0.930  ---  -0.435 
(1.679) (1.772) 
Households 201  [31.84] 
Note. Savings refer to the previous year.  (1): basic specification; (2): reduced 
set of controls; (3): full set of controls.
*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Fraction of treated households in brackets. Calculations 
based on five multiply imputed datasets in accordance with Rubin (1987). 
Data source: SAVE.   40 
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Appendix 
Proceedings: data preparation and sample selection 
Household composition. We concentrate on single and couple households with and without 
children. Other household types are excluded from the analysis. In the SOEP, we combine 
information of the individual and the household questionnaire. A household unit is assessed as 
(non) eligible to Riester by the eligibility status of adult household members. Thereby, we 
neglect potential Riester eligibility of older but cohabiting children. In the later regression, we 
control for household type by distinguishing between the following types: HH-type 1: singles; 
HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 4: couples with 
children aged 16 and younger; HH-type 5: couples with cohabiting children aged older than 
16; HH-type 6: couples with younger and older children. The information provided in SAVE 
is different. Information is provided by only one household member, the household head. 
Household heads state individual information on themselves and the partner. In case of the 
SAVE data, in regressions we distinguish households composed by singles (HH-type 1), 
couples without cohabiting children (HH-type 2), single parent (HH-type 3), and couples with 
cohabiting children (HH-type 4). 
  Single households form the reference category in all regressions for Approaches 1-2 
and 4-5 in both datasets. In Approach 3 (which considers couples with children), we use HH-
type 4 (couples with children aged 16 and younger) as reference.  
Identifying individuals eligible for Riester contracts. A crucial issue for our analysis is the 
eligibility for the Riester scheme. Eligibility is an individual attribute. However, we aggregate 
the Riester eligibility of the household heads and their partners on the household level and 
continue with all household observations with clear eligibility or non-eligibility status. Thus, a 
Riester household in our analysis is a household in which all adult members are eligible. In 
contrast, a household is classified as non-eligible if all adult household members are non-non. 
Riester eligibility is linked to the employment status of the individual. To begin with the 
SOEP, bluecollar and whitecollar workers, civil servants, trainees, apprentices, people in 
childcare leave and military/social service, people receiving early-retirement benefits, 
farmers, registered unemployed, as well as students with gross labor income higher than 400 
euros are assigned a status as being eligible according to the legal requirements. In contrast, 
free-lancers and other self-employed (with dependent employees), pensioners, and students 
with low labor income are non-eligible. The same applies to non-working individuals and to 
recipients of widow pensions, orphan benefits, or social assistance if they do not derive an 41 
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eligibility status due to other reasons. If a person is eligible, we also assign this status to a 
spouse who lives in the same household. The proceeding is similar for the SAVE data, 
however with some minor exceptions. All free-lancers and self-employed (except farmers) are 
treated as non-eligible since we do not have information on the number of dependent 
employees. Moreover, training, retraining, apprenticeship, and academic studies form one 
answer category so that we cannot identify the single subgroups. We therefore exclude these 
households from the analysis.   
  In the regressions, we include employment dummies for self-employed, bluecollar 
worker, civil servant, unemployed, and other type. Whitecollar workers serve as reference 
category. 
Construction of treatment and control groups. Treatment and control observations are 
grouped according to the scheme displayed in Table 2. For the different year comparisons, we 
build subsamples of households that appear in both periods and fulfill the necessary 
conditions in Table 2. For instance, in approach 3 we compare the savings ratio of married 
couple with two children vs. one child. For the 2000-2004 comparison, we use a subsample of 
all households surveyed with one or two in both periods.  
Savings variables and control variables. The savings ratio is calculated by dividing the 
monthly regular savings amount by the net household income (SOEP). In SAVE, all income 
and savings variables refer to the previous year. We take the total amount of savings of the 
previous year, and divide it by 12 (to put it on a monthly basis) and by the average household 
net income. All income and savings variables are deflated according to the consumer price 
index provided by the Federal Statistical Office (2007).  
Depending on the approach and the specification, we use different set of control 
variables. The age group variables refer to the age of the household head. We delete all 
household observations with a head younger than 20 or older than 55 in the reference 2002 
(younger than 18 or older than 53 in 2000, etc.). The employment status also refers to the 
head of household. Whitecollar is the reference category. In addition, we control for 
bluecollar workers, civil servants, self-employed, unemployed, and others (which are people 
who do not belong to one of the other groups). A very small fraction in the SOEP declares 
more than one status (e.g., bluecollar but unemployed). We keep these very few individuals if 
their Riester eligibility status is unambiguous.  42 
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We also control for debt repayments in some specifications. The SOEP surveys 
repayments for consumer and housing loan. We use this information to construct the binary 
variables credit and homeloan. In SAVE, we proceed in a similar and use the control variables 
credit (for consumer credit repayments) and homeloan   (comprising building loans and 
mortgages.  
The weighted mean equivalent household income is calculated using the OECD-
modified scale (http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,3425,en_2649_33933_35411112_1_1 
_1_1,00.html) which assigns a factor of one for the household head, a half for each additional 
adult, and 0.3 for each child. The resulting equivalent household income is weighted with the 
household weight provided with the SOEP and SAVE data (age and income), respectively.    
Finally, we delete observations with missing information in one of the relevant variables or 
with an income below the lowest or above the highest income percentile.  
Table A1. Reliability of the SOEP savings variable 
  Saving ratio  Saving (y/n) 
 Tobit  Probit 
Household type 2  -0.470
* 0.008 
 (0.276)  (0.027) 
Household type 3  -7.611
*** -0.499
***
 (0.342)  (0.031) 
Household type 4  -4.829
*** -0.259
***
 (0.265)  (0.026) 
Household type 5  -5.452
*** -0.244
***
 (0.334)  (0.035) 
Household type 6  -7.426
*** -0.490
***
 (0.369)  (0.038) 
University entrance  0.666
*** 0.038
*
qualification (0.218)  (0.023) 
University degree  1.750
*** 0.083
***




 (0.367)  (0.030) 
Blue collar  -1.818
*** -0.179
***




 (0.299)  (0.027) 
Civil servant  -0.852
*** 0.084
**




 (0.370)  (0.034) 
Income (defl.)  3.492
*** 0.343
***
in 1,000  (0.087)  (0.011) 
Age below 30 years  -1.412
** -0.092 
 (0.638)  (0.056) 
Age 30-39 years  -1.297
** -0.066 
 (0.595)  (0.053) 43 
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Age 40-49 years  -2.523
*** -0.174
***
 (0.599)  (0.054) 
Age 50 and above  -2.712
*** -0.240
***








 (0.179)  (0.019) 
Dummy 2004  -1.476
*** -0.113
***
 (0.244)  (0.024) 
Dummy 2005  -1.296
*** -0.090
***
 (0.246)  (0.025) 
Dummy 2006  -1.535
*** -0.132
***
 (0.244)  (0.024) 
Dummy 2007  -1.702
*** -0.101
***




 (0.635)  (0.058) 
Note.  Number of observations: 31,198. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Note. HH-type 1: singles; 
HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 
4: couples with children aged 16 and younger; HH-type 5: couples with 
cohabiting children aged older than 16; HH-type 6: couples with younger 
and older children. Own calculations based on SOEP data, waves 2000 
and 2004-2007.Data source: SOEP, waves 2000 and 2004-2007. 44 
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Table A2. Reliability of the SOEP savings variable: switchers (into and out of Riester contract)  
Saving (y/n)  Saving (y/n)  Saving (y/n)  Saving (y/n)  Saving (y/n)  Saving (y/n) 
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
2004-2006 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2007 2006-2007 2006-2007 






contract  (0.061) (0.067) (0.052) (0.060) (0.058) (0.065) 
Switcher out of Riester  -0.288
*** -0.196
* -0.070 -0.042 -0.009 0.024 
contract  (0.097) (0.103) (0.096) (0.106) (0.085) (0.092) 
Control variables  no yes no yes no yes 
Number of observations  4,900  4,585  5,510 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.  Data source: SOEP, waves 2004, 2006, 2007.45 
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collar  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
2000  Treat 0.189 0.172 0.074 0.383 0.101 0.081 0.415 0.074  0.313 
Control  0.478 0.065 0.167 0.210 0.043 0.038 0.167 0.118  0.124 
2004 
Treat 0.158 0.191 0.070 0.337 0.149 0.094 0.434 0.109  0.294 
Control  0.468 0.097 0.188 0.134 0.065 0.048 0.000 0.000  0.000 
2000 
Treat 0.186 0.174 0.073 0.385 0.098 0.083 0.414 0.071  0.318 
Control  0.448 0.086 0.190 0.190 0.049 0.037 0.209 0.147  0.110 
2005 
Treat 0.153 0.196 0.073 0.326 0.156 0.096 0.426 0.113  0.299 
Control  0.485 0.104 0.209 0.098 0.080 0.025 0.000 0.000  0.000 
2 
2000 
Treat 0.163 0.083 0.115 0.470 0.074 0.094 0.286 0.137  0.409 
Control  0.425 0.057 0.217 0.198 0.057 0.047 0.142 0.170  0.151 
2004 
Treat 0.147 0.091 0.112 0.382 0.139 0.129 0.318 0.195  0.385 
Control  0.434 0.075 0.264 0.104 0.057 0.066 0.000 0.000  0.000 
2000 
Treat 0.167 0.081 0.112 0.463 0.077 0.099 0.295 0.126  0.411 
Control  0.420 0.080 0.260 0.150 0.040 0.050 0.180 0.230  0.130 
2005 
Treat 0.146 0.100 0.119 0.353 0.152 0.131 0.318 0.193  0.391 
Control  0.460 0.110 0.270 0.070 0.050 0.040 0.000 0.000  0.000 
3 
2000 
Treat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.834 0.046 0.120 0.267 0.086  0.469 
Control  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.641 0.266 0.094 0.223 0.117  0.508 
2004 
Treat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.629 0.162 0.208 0.311 0.104  0.473 
Control  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.504 0.496 0.000 0.234 0.188  0.465 
2000 
Treat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.863 0.036 0.100 0.267 0.075  0.474 
Control  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.604 0.238 0.157 0.272 0.111  0.494 
2005 
Treat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.594 0.179 0.226 0.329 0.090  0.451 
Control  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.413 0.587 0.000 0.264 0.132  0.515 
4 
2000 
Treat 0.119 0.053 0.115 0.593 0.045 0.074 0.358 0.119  0.370 
Control  0.164 0.088 0.106 0.463 0.081 0.098 0.285 0.145  0.427 
2004 
Treat 0.115 0.053 0.123 0.461 0.095 0.152 0.407 0.173  0.366 
Control  0.145 0.098 0.106 0.379 0.147 0.125 0.305 0.195  0.389 
2000 
Treat 0.116 0.079 0.113 0.585 0.055 0.052 0.351 0.101  0.372 
Control  0.169 0.085 0.110 0.447 0.087 0.101 0.291 0.141  0.425 
2006 
Treat 0.101 0.067 0.125 0.402 0.134 0.171 0.409 0.116  0.378 
Control  0.148 0.129 0.113 0.318 0.177 0.115 0.303 0.211  0.391 
2000 
Treat 0.122 0.081 0.096 0.588 0.052 0.061 0.357 0.122  0.359 
Control  0.182 0.087 0.106 0.448 0.085 0.093 0.296 0.148  0.425 
2007 
Treat 0.087 0.087 0.119 0.388 0.157 0.162 0.435 0.110  0.371 
Control  0.170 0.128 0.098 0.280 0.189 0.135 0.299 0.202  0.416 
5 
2000 
Treat 0.104 0.054 0.092 0.604 0.060 0.085 0.332 0.120  0.389 
Control  0.169 0.090 0.110 0.454 0.079 0.097 0.286 0.146  0.427 
2004 
Treat 0.089 0.060 0.101 0.465 0.127 0.158 0.373 0.171  0.370 
Control  0.153 0.099 0.109 0.373 0.144 0.123 0.305 0.195  0.391 
2000 
Treat 0.115 0.067 0.096 0.584 0.055 0.082 0.310 0.108  0.413 
Control  0.172 0.089 0.115 0.438 0.089 0.096 0.300 0.143  0.415 
2006 
Treat 0.079 0.063 0.106 0.387 0.171 0.195 0.377 0.115  0.394 
Control  0.158 0.135 0.118 0.318 0.167 0.103 0.305 0.218  0.388 
2000 
Treat 0.113 0.074 0.081 0.585 0.062 0.085 0.326 0.117  0.398 
Control  0.188 0.089 0.116 0.432 0.089 0.086 0.293 0.156  0.420 
2007 
Treat 0.064 0.072 0.100 0.391 0.200 0.172 0.398 0.106  0.394 
Control  0.187 0.141 0.107 0.260 0.177 0.128 0.295 0.208  0.407 
Table continues 46 



















Age in years 
Credit  Home-
loan  <30 30-39  40-49 50+ 
1 
2000 
Treat 0.093  0.069  0.039  2.567  0.117 0.394 0.344 0.114 0.347  0.298 
Control 0.323 0.022  0.263 2.056  0.108 0.296 0.333 0.226 0.280  0.194 
2004 
Treat 0.065  0.067  0.041  2.786  0.039 0.325 0.390 0.230 0.358  0.341 
Control 0.629 0.000  0.371 2.015  0.081 0.210 0.382 0.323 0.280  0.210 
2000 
Treat 0.092  0.069  0.041  2.574  0.114 0.396 0.347 0.111 0.350  0.301 
Control 0.294 0.018  0.233 2.029  0.080 0.270 0.368 0.258 0.313  0.202 
2005 
Treat 0.070  0.067  0.041  2.795  0.029 0.296 0.403 0.264 0.270  0.349 
Control 0.626 0.000  0.374 1.985  0.037 0.202 0.301 0.454 0.172  0.190 
2 
2000 
Treat 0.133  0.012  0.030  2.007  0.135 0.413 0.334 0.084 0.351  0.223 
Control 0.462 0.009  0.094 1.451  0.142 0.245 0.321 0.245 0.264  0.160 
2004 
Treat 0.075  0.012  0.030  2.109  0.054 0.334 0.410 0.187 0.373  0.259 
Control 0.877 0.000  0.123 1.316  0.104 0.179 0.349 0.358 0.189  0.160 
2000 
Treat 0.125  0.018  0.030  2.019  0.130 0.412 0.342 0.082 0.363  0.223 
Control 0.380 0.010  0.090 1.428  0.060 0.250 0.410 0.260 0.300  0.160 
2005 
Treat 0.077  0.017  0.033  2.096  0.037 0.300 0.428 0.224 0.280  0.272 
Control 0.830 0.000  0.170 1.288  0.040 0.170 0.290 0.500 0.170  0.110 
3 
2000 
Treat 0.134  0.018  0.032  2.367  0.074 0.569 0.293 0.026 0.371  0.351 
Control 0.102 0.016  0.039 2.208  0.063 0.324 0.457 0.141 0.379  0.246 
2004 
Treat 0.066  0.018  0.036  2.591  0.008 0.427 0.471 0.088 0.405  0.401 
Control 0.070 0.020  0.031 2.197  0.012 0.246 0.434 0.285 0.379  0.277 
2000 
Treat 0.137  0.028  0.024  2.384  0.088 0.562 0.282 0.024 0.357  0.353 
Control 0.068 0.013  0.047 2.266  0.038 0.332 0.477 0.145 0.409  0.268 
2005 
Treat 0.073  0.028  0.038  2.615  0.009 0.393 0.481 0.115 0.297  0.423 
Control 0.055 0.009  0.034 2.210  0.000 0.170 0.438 0.387 0.336  0.311 
4 
2000 
Treat 0.144  0.008  0.012  2.114  0.115 0.481 0.288 0.078 0.399  0.309 
Control 0.106 0.014  0.031 2.015  0.132 0.403 0.345 0.087 0.350  0.216 
2004 
Treat 0.049  0.008  0.012  2.222  0.049 0.342 0.444 0.148 0.469  0.309 
Control 0.080 0.012  0.033 2.107  0.049 0.332 0.407 0.196 0.361  0.258 
2000 
Treat 0.137  0.018  0.027  2.139  0.159 0.451 0.280 0.061 0.430  0.305 
Control 0.110 0.017  0.024 2.015  0.125 0.403 0.342 0.094 0.364  0.208 
2006 
Treat 0.079  0.015  0.027  2.257  0.027 0.308 0.491 0.165 0.320  0.369 
Control 0.073 0.014  0.034 2.037  0.025 0.270 0.418 0.278 0.265  0.259 
2000 
Treat 0.130  0.009  0.029  2.119  0.171 0.470 0.272 0.046 0.386  0.284 
Control 0.100 0.017  0.021 1.993  0.126 0.410 0.336 0.094 0.374  0.210 
2007 
Treat 0.061  0.009  0.035  2.279  0.020 0.287 0.472 0.209 0.307  0.359 
Control 0.058 0.017  0.040 2.034  0.015 0.241 0.426 0.311 0.265  0.267 
5 
2000 
Treat 0.139  0.009  0.025  2.161  0.114 0.462 0.313 0.079 0.396  0.316 
Control 0.105 0.014  0.029 2.002  0.133 0.403 0.342 0.087 0.349  0.210 
2004 
Treat 0.063  0.009  0.028  2.295  0.044 0.307 0.472 0.161 0.465  0.329 
Control 0.079 0.012  0.031 2.088  0.050 0.339 0.399 0.197 0.358  0.252 
2000 
Treat 0.123  0.022  0.029  2.161  0.139 0.457 0.300 0.063 0.433  0.291 
Control 0.112 0.016  0.023 2.000  0.128 0.398 0.341 0.096 0.359  0.208 
2006 
Treat 0.084  0.019  0.034  2.335  0.029 0.291 0.493 0.180 0.320  0.373 
Control 0.071 0.013  0.032 1.997  0.024 0.274 0.411 0.281 0.262  0.250 
2000 
Treat 0.123  0.013  0.028  2.169  0.157 0.460 0.287 0.057 0.394  0.296 
Control 0.104 0.015  0.021 1.960  0.121 0.399 0.345 0.101 0.365  0.202 
2007 
Treat 0.070  0.015  0.036  2.374  0.021 0.283 0.457 0.230 0.323  0.379 
Control 0.071 0.014  0.037 1.962  0.014 0.233 0.424 0.323 0.254  0.252 
Note. HH-type 1: singles; HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 4: couples with children aged 16 and 
younger; HH-type 5: couples with cohabiting children aged older than 16; HH-type 6: couples with younger and older children. Own 
calculations based on SOEP data, waves 2000 and 2004-2007. 47 
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ed  1 2 3 4 
1 
2005 
Treat  0.136 0.160 0.133 0.572  0.318  0.293 0.157  0.267 0.026  0.004 
Control 0.292 0.333 0.135 0.240  0.057  0.125 0.005  0.740 0.000  0.073 
2007 
Treat  0.142 0.179 0.129 0.549  0.337  0.306 0.196  0.214 0.031  0.003 
Control 0.370 0.412 0.161 0.057  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.953 0.000  0.047 
2005 
Treat  0.120 0.165 0.120 0.595  0.317  0.279 0.167  0.285 0.025  0.007 
Control 0.355 0.444 0.083 0.118  0.118  0.171 0.000  0.681 0.000  0.059 
2008 
Treat  0.120 0.190 0.113 0.577  0.333  0.254 0.177  0.254 0.037  0.000 
Control 0.414 0.414 0.112 0.059  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.941 0.000  0.059 
2006 
Treat  0.128 0.217 0.125 0.529  0.341  0.227 0.131  0.329 0.030  0.007 
Control 0.337 0.266 0.188 0.209  0.016  0.071 0.021  0.860 0.019  0.017 
2007 
Treat  0.125 0.233 0.124 0.519  0.349  0.240 0.150  0.287 0.030  0.002 
Control 0.354 0.292 0.197 0.157  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.991 0.000  0.009 
2006 
Treat  0.108 0.214 0.121 0.556  0.325  0.210 0.145  0.344 0.028  0.010 
Control 0.359 0.333 0.148 0.160  0.038  0.070 0.054  0.848 0.000  0.010 
2008 
Treat  0.098 0.248 0.115 0.538  0.350  0.208 0.158  0.294 0.037  0.002 
Control 0.369 0.363 0.168 0.100  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.980 0.000  0.020 
5 
2005 
Treat  0.105 0.105 0.131 0.660  0.183  0.262 0.267  0.314 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.229 0.134 0.219 0.418  0.216  0.540 0.214  0.145 0.000  0.000 
2007 
Treat  0.105 0.131 0.105 0.660  0.372  0.340 0.215  0.256 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.229 0.134 0.219 0.418  0.269  0.487 0.214  0.155 0.000  0.000 
2005 
Treat  0.153 0.031 0.239 0.577  0.362  0.245 0.215  0.270 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.217 0.137 0.162 0.483  0.199  0.579 0.178  0.188 0.000  0.000 
2008 
Treat  0.123 0.123 0.215 0.540  0.374  0.276 0.202  0.209 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.217 0.172 0.172 0.439  0.135  0.492 0.227  0.238 0.000  0.000 
2006 
Treat  0.097 0.139 0.153 0.611  0.320  0.345 0.169  0.261 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.225 0.135 0.185 0.455  0.256  0.415 0.189  0.247 0.007  0.011 
2007  Treat  0.111 0.153 0.153 0.583  0.355  0.320 0.186  0.247 0.014  0.000 
Control 0.208 0.140 0.180 0.472  0.273  0.409 0.183  0.235 0.006  0.002 
2006 
Treat  0.130 0.035 0.222 0.614  0.370  0.332 0.145  0.275 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.187 0.194 0.152 0.466  0.179  0.408 0.253  0.251 0.010  0.015 
2008 
Treat  0.114 0.098 0.206 0.582  0.389  0.253 0.209  0.231 0.000  0.000 
Control 0.173 0.231 0.152 0.444  0.177  0.428 0.234  0.231 0.015  0.000 
Table continues 48 
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Group  Income in 
€1,000 
Age in years 
Credit Homeloan 
<30 30-39  40-49 50+ 
1 
2005  Treat  2.007  0.093 0.293 0.367 0.247 0.171 0.252 
Control  1.574 0.010 0.104 0.156 0.729 0.026 0.141
2007 
Treat  1.946  0.058 0.243 0.397 0.302 0.155 0.241 
Control  1.551  0.005 0.109 0.104 0.781 0.078 0.188 
2005 
Treat  2.062  0.095 0.268 0.369 0.267 0.185 0.269 
Control  1.556  0.030 0.142 0.089 0.740 0.059 0.071 
2008 
Treat  1.874  0.046 0.205 0.398 0.352 0.139 0.270 
Control  1.603  0.000 0.083 0.118 0.799 0.124 0.089 
2006 
Treat  2.014  0.079 0.250 0.382 0.289 0.146 0.303 
Control  1.742  0.019 0.078 0.242 0.661 0.079 0.164 
2007 
Treat  2.077  0.059 0.234 0.368 0.339 0.174 0.270 
Control  1.696  0.019 0.078 0.207 0.696 0.102 0.169 
2006 
Treat  2.048  0.080 0.227 0.382 0.311 0.149 0.308 
Control  1.746  0.010 0.108 0.200 0.683 0.074 0.150 
2008 
Treat  2.004  0.040 0.209 0.366 0.385 0.157 0.287 
Control  1.621  0.010 0.058 0.180 0.753 0.152 0.148 
5 
2005 
Treat  1.553  0.052 0.492 0.298 0.157 0.110 0.199 
Control  1.252  0.115 0.193 0.378 0.315 0.130 0.099 
2007 
Treat  1.610  0.026 0.288 0.450 0.236 0.115 0.241 
Control  1.154  0.067 0.191 0.389 0.353 0.097 0.122 
2005 
Treat  1.426  0.092 0.448 0.338 0.123 0.104 0.135 
Control  1.254  0.137 0.153 0.366 0.343 0.146 0.140 
2008 
Treat  1.504  0.031 0.307 0.417 0.245 0.166 0.184 
Control  1.133  0.057 0.160 0.371 0.412 0.094 0.124 
2006 
Treat  1.540  0.097 0.350 0.289 0.264 0.128 0.278 
Control  1.198  0.073 0.235 0.400 0.292 0.146 0.167 
2007 
Treat  1.543  0.069 0.308 0.330 0.292 0.133 0.225 
Control  1.232  0.051 0.229 0.400 0.320 0.131 0.146 
2006 
Treat  1.459  0.063 0.456 0.307 0.174 0.127 0.241 
Control  1.201  0.087 0.161 0.389 0.363 0.123 0.181 
2008 
Treat  1.508  0.032 0.396 0.329 0.244 0.136 0.196 
Control  1.185  0.029 0.181 0.343 0.447 0.110 0.151 
Note.  HH-type 1: singles; HH-type 2: couples without children; HH-type 3: single parents; HH-type 4: couples with children. 
Employment states and age refer to the head of household. Own calculations. Data source: SAVE, 2005-2008.   